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2OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Clinton Burns was one of 23 defendants charged in a drug conspiracy indictment. 
Burns pled guilty to unlawful distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine.  21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District Court imposed the 20-year maximum
penalty. 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(C).  He appeals his sentence.  We will affirm.
I.
Burns appeals on four grounds.  First, he argues the District Court disregarded
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and applied the sentencing guidelines as
mandatory.  He points to an exchange at the sentencing hearing in which the court said
Booker was inapplicable.  But the court was addressing an Apprendi argument, Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), namely whether it could consider for sentencing
purposes information not found beyond a reasonable doubt.  In context, nothing in the
court’s statement suggested it was disregarding Booker when applying the sentencing
guidelines.  Nor does the record suggest the court treated the sentencing guidelines as
mandatory.  We see no error.
Second, Burns argues, by only considering his criminal history and the guidelines
calculation, the court created a presumptively reasonable range of sentences and failed to
consider other factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Nothing in the record suggests the
District Court considered the range of sentences presumptively reasonable.  While a court
3must give “meaningful consideration” to the 3553(a) factors, it need not “discuss and
make findings of each of the 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the
factors into account in sentencing.”  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir.
2006).  The District Court did not address every factor, but it addressed all the relevant
facts and the relevant 3553(a) factors in responding to both government counsel’s and
Burns’s counsel’s arguments.  The court “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a
reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”  Rita v. United
States, 127 S.Ct 2456, 2468 (2007).  We see no error.
Third, Burns argues his sentence was unreasonable because the court failed to
adequately articulate its consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and to provide
sufficient reasons; therefore it did not impose a “sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with” the statute.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  A sentence is unreasonable
if “the trial court abused its discretion.”  Rita, 127 S.Ct at 2465.  Burns bears the burden
of demonstrating unreasonableness. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329.  As discussed above, the
District Court adequately addressed all the relevant 3553(a) factors.  
Fourth, Burns contends the court should have granted a downward departure under
U.S.S.G. 4A1.3(b) because his criminal history did not warrant career criminal status. 
But the District Court addressed Burns’s criminal history and reasonably declined to
depart.  
II.
4Accordingly, the sentence was not unreasonable and we will affirm the judgment
of sentence imposed by the District Court.
